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I. The Trial Court erred in determining what the parties meant by their reference to GT40 "based 
on the plain meaning contained in the contracts." 
1 
A. The meaning of words used in a contract, and whether the words used are or are not 
ambiguous, cannot always be determined solely by reference to words "within the four 
corners" of the contract 2 
B. Utah has adopted Corbin's reasoning and has rejected a strict application of the parol 
evidence rule, which was previously followed in Utah 
3 
C. The parties' use of the term "GT40" in this case was meant to identify a concept car 
that Ford introduced at the North American International Auto Show in 2002, which it 
later produced and distributed to dealers as the "GT." 
7 
D. Watkins' proffered interpretation of "GT40" was, and is tenable, plausible and 
reasonable 
11 
E. The presence of an integration clause in a contract does not, as Henry Day Ford 
contends, prelude a court's consideration of extrinsic, or "parol," evidence to determine 
the meaning of words and terms in the contract 
13 
F. The trial court's conclusion of law that "GT40," based on the "plain meaning" of the 
parties' contracts, unambiguously referred to a vehicle other than the "GT" that Ford 
Motor Co. subsequently allocated to Henry Day Ford, should be reversed, and this case 
remanded for further proceedings 
14 
II. The trial court erred in concluding that Watkins waived his right to purchase from Henry Day 
Ford up to two Ford GTs (as the GT40 was later called), should Ford Motor Co. allocate Ford 
GTs to Henry Day Ford 
15 
A. The proof required to establish waiver is that enunciated by the Utah Supreme Court in 
the Soter's case 
15 
B. Watkins has marshaled evidence and argument in support of the trial court's findings 
and conclusions on waiver 
n 
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16 
C. The evidence at trial, when marshaled, does not establish or indicate a distinct 
intention by Tom Watkins to waive a contractual right that was known to him 
17 
Addendum A: "From Concept to Production: GT40 to Ford GT," Ford Motor Co. bulletin, June 
2003 (Defendant Henry Day Ford's Trial Exhibit no. 12) 
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I. The Trial Court erred in determining what the parties meant by their reference to GT40 
"based on the plain meaning contained in the contracts/9 
Henry Day Ford contended at trial, as it does on appeal, that its two contracts with Tom 
Watkins unambiguously identified the subject matter of their agreements to be the Ford "GT40." 
It furthermore contended that the parol evidence rule precluded the trial court from considering 
any evidence outside the written agreements themselves, in order to determine what the parties 
meant by their use of UGT40." In arguing that the trial court could not consider any extrinsic 
evidence concerning what the parties meant by their use of the term "GT40," Henry Day Ford 
emphasized that the agreements each contained an integration clause and, thus, were intended to 
be the final expression of the parties' agreement. As Ford Motor Co. subsequently allocated to it 
IV 
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three Ford "GTs," but no "GT40s," Henry Day Ford contended that it did not breach its contracts 
by refusing to sell to Watkins the first two GTs that Ford allocated to it. 
Henry Day Ford convinced the trial court that it was, as a matter of law, required to 
determine the parties' intentions "based [solely] upon the plain meaning of the contracts," see 
Conclusion of Law no. 3. The trial court concluded that it was required to do so, based, 
apparently, on the fact that the two contracts each contained an integration clause, thus indicating 
that the contracts "were intended to be the final and complete expression of the parties' bargain." 
See Conclusions of Law nos. 1 and 2. The court, based on the "plain meaning" of the contracts 
and the fact that the contracts contained integration clauses, concluded that the contracts were 
"clear and unambiguous." See Conclusion of Law no. 1. Implicitly, the court concluded that the 
parties' use of the term GT40 was clear and unambiguous. The trial court found that Ford Motor 
Co., commencing in 2004, allocated to Henry Day Ford, and that Henry Day Ford received three 
Ford GTs. Findings of Fact nos. 29-34, 37. However, it concluded that as the parties' contracts 
unambiguously provided that Henry Day Ford would sell and Watkins would buy "GT40s," 
Henry Day Ford was not obligated to sell to Watkins "GTs" when Ford later allocated them to 
the dealership. See Conclusion of Law, nos. 4 and 5. 
A. The meaning of words used in a contract, and whether the words used are 
or are not ambiguous, cannot always be determined solely by reference to words 
"within the four corners" of the contract 
Corbin, in his treatise on contracts, strongly criticizes the notion that the meaning of all 
terms in a contract can be divined by looking only to language "within the four corners" of a 
contract. According to Corbin: 
Words and acts are merely symbols of expression. No person can determine the 
2 
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meaning of written words merely by gluing his or her eyes within the four 
corners of a square paper. It is human beings who give meanings to words, and 
words in themselves have no meaning. When a judge refuses to consider relevant 
extrinsic evidence on the ground that the meaning of stated words is plain and 
clear, that decision is formed by and wholly based upon the completely extrinsic 
evidence of the judge's own personal education and experience. 
5 Corbin on Contracts, § 24.7 at 39 (1998) (emphasis added). The eminent jurist Oliver Wendell 
Holmes expressed a similar sentiment, when he observed in the course of a 1917 case: 
A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living 
thought and may vary greatly in color or content according to the circumstances 
and time in which it is used. 
Towne v. Eisner, 38 S.Ct. 158, 245 U.S. 418, 425, 62 L.Ed. 372 (1917). 
The Oregon Supreme Court, in a 1932 case, observed that: 
The flexibility of or multiplicity in the meaning of words is the principal source of 
difficulty in the interpretation of language. Words are the conduits by which 
thoughts are communicated, yet scarcely any of them have such a fixed and single 
meaning that they are incapable of denoting more than one thought... it is said 
that a court in construing the language of the parties must put itself into the shoes 
of the parties. That alone would not suffice; it must also adopt their vernacular. 
Hurst v.W.J. Lake & Co., 16 P.2d 627, 141 Ore. 306 (1932). 
B. Utah has adopted Corbin's reasoning and has rejected a strict application of the 
parol evidence rule, which was previously followed in Utah. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Assn., 907 P.2d 264 (Utah 
1995), embraced Corbin's reasoning when it held that: 
When determining whether a contract is ambiguous, any relevant evidence 
must be considered. Otherwise, a determination of ambiguity is inherently 
one-sided, namely, it is based solely on the "extrinsic evidence of the judge's own 
linguistic education and experience." 
Ward, 268 (emphasis added) (quoting Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Drayage & Rigging Co., 
3 
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69 Cal. 2d 33, 442 P.2d 641, 643, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561 (Cal. 1968) (quoting Corbin § 579, at 225 
n.5 (Supp. 1964)). According to the Utah Supreme Court in Ward, "Rational interpretation of 
[contract terms] requires at least a preliminary consideration of all credible evidence to prove the 
intention of the parties . . . so that the court can place itself in the same situation in which the 
parties found themselves at the time of contracting." Ward, 268 (quoting Pacific Gas & Elec. 
Co., 442 P.2d at 645. In embracing Corbin's reasoning, the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged 
that, "While there is Utah case law that espouses a stricter application of the rule and would 
restrict determination of whether ambiguity exists to a judge's determination of the meaning of 
the terms of the writing itself, the better reasoned approach is to consider the writing in light 
of the surrounding circumstances." Ward, 268 (emphasis added). 
Subsequent Utah cases, or at least one line of Utah cases, acknowledge the holding in 
Ward as the "better reasoned approach." These cases hold that the determination of whether 
terms in a contract are or are not ambiguous, is not, as Henry Day Ford contends on appeal, 
restricted or limited to an examination of only those terms and words within the four corners of a 
written document. See Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, 48 P.3d 918, 919; Nielson v. 
Gold's Gym, 2003 UT 37, 78 P.3d 600, 601; Gillmor v. Macey, 2005 UT App 351,1f|f34, 35, 121 
P.3d 57; cert, denied, 126 P.3d 772 (Utah 2005); The Cantamar, L.L.C. v. Champagne, 2006 UT 
App 321, fflj 26-29, 142 P.3d 140; Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, 190 P.3d 1269. According to 
Peterson, "In determining whether a contract is ambiguous, the court is not bound to consider 
only the language of the contract." 48 P.3d 918, 919. In Gillmor, the Utah Court of Appeals 
observed that: 
Utah case law has rejected the strict application of the 'four corners' rule, which 
limits the boundaries of inquiry into whether an ambiguity exists in a contract to 
4 
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the contract's "four corners" and effectively excludes evidence of any surrounding 
circumstances - - outside the writing - - that might indicate that the contract 
language lacks the required degree of clarity. 
* # # 
Likewise, Utah no longer strictly applies the "parol evidence rule" or the "plain 
meaning rule," which exclude the use of any parol evidence to show whether a 
contract's language lacks the required degree of clarity. 
sjc * # 
Instead, Utah law has made these rules of interpretation just part of the initial 
inquiry to determine whether an ambiguity exists in contract language. They are 
no longer the determinative rules they once were . . . 
Gillmor, [^35 n. 14 (citations omitted); see also Cantamar, [^26 n.5. 
The Court of Appeals, in Gillmor, acknowledged that line of Utah cases that Henry Day 
Ford identifies at pp. 14-15 of its Brief, which hold that "if the language within the four corners 
of the contract is unambiguous," that courts "'first look to the four corners of the agreement to 
determine the intentions of the parties . . . ' from the plain meaning of the contractual language." 
Gillmor, |34 (quoting from Central Fla. Invs., Inc. v. Parkwest Assocs., 2002 UT 3, ^ [12, 40 P.3d 
599). Notwithstanding the pronouncements in similar such cases, the Utah Court of Appeals, in 
Gillmor, stated that: 
However, Utah law does not strictly require courts to only view the terms of a 
contract within its four corners, according to their plain meaning, when making a 
determination of whether there is an ambiguity in a contract. 
Under Utah law, if the initial review of the plain language of the contract, within 
its four corners, reveals no patently obvious ambiguities, the inquiry into whether 
an ambiguity exists in a contract does not always end there. Utah's rules of 
contract interpretation allow courts to consider any relevant evidence to determine 
whether a latent ambiguity exists in contract terms that otherwise appear to be 
unambiguous. 
5 
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Gillmor, 1fl[34, 35 (emphasis in original). According to Ward, "when determining whether a 
contract is ambiguous, any relevant evidence must be considered." Ward, 907 P.2d at 268 
(emphasis added). A proffered interpretation of a contractual term, by reference to extrinsic 
evidence, must nonetheless be "tenable." Gillmor, |^37 n. 15. According to Daines, it "must be 
plausible and reasonable in light of the language used." Daines, Tf31 (quoting First Am. Title Ins. 
Co. v. J.B. Ranch, Inc., 966 P.2d 834, 837 (Utah 1998)). 
The Gillmor case provides a good example of where language in a contract, seemingly 
unambiguous on its face, was, when considered within the context of the parties' agreement at 
the time they made it and under the circumstances at the time, determined to be ambiguous. At 
issue in Gillmor was a written easement, in which the owners of one piece of property had 
previously bargained for the right to use their neighbor's property to access their own. The 
easement, however, provided that, "Gillmor agrees that he will not allow the use of and will not 
himself use any three-wheeled motorized All Terrain Vehicles or any two-wheeled motorcycles 
or motorized 'dirt bikes' on the Easements at anytime." Gillmor, ^4. Approximately 15 years 
later, the Maceys, who had purchased part of the servient estate, stopped a Gillmor descendant 
who was crossing their property while riding a four-wheeled ATV, and told him he could not do 
so. The Maceys told the Gillmor descendent that he should load the ATV onto a trailer and 
transport it in that manner to the Gillmor property. A civil action ensued in which the trial court 
was asked to determine if the reference in the easement to "three-wheeled motorized ATV 
vehicles," "two-wheeled motorcycles," and "motorized dirt bikes" meant that the Gillmors and 
their guests could not cross the Maceys' property while on four-wheeled AT Vs. 
The Gillmors' argument to the trial court was much like that that Henry Day Ford makes 
6 
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in this case: the language in the easement was clear, in that it expressly prohibited the Gillmors 
from crossing their neighbor's property on three-wheeled ATV's, two-wheeled motorcycles, and 
two-wheeled dirt bikes. But it did not prohibit them from crossing on four-wheeled ATVs. The 
restrictions, argued the Gillmors, were clear on their face and were not ambiguous; and the 
easement clearly did not proscribe the Gillmors' use of ATVs with four or more wheels. Id., f 12, 
32-33. The Court of Appeals conceded, 
Admittedly, when viewed in isolation, the Agreement's plain language would 
seem to lead to the conclusion that the terms "two-wheeled motorcycles or 
motorized 'dirt bikes'" and "three-wheeled motorized All Terrain Vehicles" are 
not at all ambiguous. On its face, the Agreement appears only to limit the use of 
"two-wheeled motorcycles or motorized 'dirt bikes'" and "three-wheeled 
motorized All Terrain Vehicles" on the easements; it says nothing of four-wheeled 
ATVs." 
Gillmor, f34. The Court of Appeals explained, "nonetheless, by considering evidence of the 
circumstances surrounding the creation of the Agreement in 1985 [which it concluded was 
proper], it becomes clear that the Agreement is ambiguous as concerns the use of four-wheeled 
ATVs on the easements." Id., ^|36. The Court of Appeals noted that in 1985 four-wheeled ATVs 
were new and novel, and the court record indicated that the parties who negotiated the conditions 
attached to the use of the easements, at the time were not aware that four-wheeled ATVs existed. 
The trial court furthermore had received and considered evidence that the Maceys' predecessor 
had sought to prohibit the Gillmors' use of motorcycles, dirt bikes, and three-wheeled ATVs out 
of a concern regarding the noise and dust they caused. Id., f37. The Court of Appeals agreed that 
the Maceys' argument that the language in the easement barred the use of four-wheeled ATVs 
was tenable, plausible and consistent with the terms used in the easement; as was the Gillmors' 
interpretation, which they based on the "plain meaning" of the words used in the easement. The 
7 
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Court of Appeals, in the end, affirmed the decision of the trial court which had, first, based on 
extrinsic evidence, determined that the terms used in the easement, while seemingly 
unambiguous on their face, were in fact ambiguous; and second, had determined that the parties 
had by their use of the pertinent language intended to proscribe the use of a class of vehicles 
including motorcycles, dirt bikes, and three-wheeled ATVs that, without reference to the exact 
number of wheels they had, were noisy and stirred up dust. Id., ^[37-42. Accordingly, the trial 
court held, based on extrinsic evidence, that the easement barred the Gillmors from crossing the 
Macey property on four-wheeled ATVs. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling. 
C. The parties9 use of the term "GT40" in this case was meant to identify a concept 
car that Ford introduced at the North American International Auto Show in 2002, 
which it later produced and distributed to its dealers as the "GT." 
The trial court confined itself to the "four corners" of the contracts in determining that the 
parties' use of the term "GT40" was clear and unambiguous, and that a "GT40" was clearly 
something different and other than a "GT." The court confined it analysis of ambiguity to the 
terms used in the contract, specifically "GT40," without reference to extrinsic evidence received 
as testimony at trial; apparently because it concluded that that is what the cases cited to it by 
Henry Day Ford l required it to do. 
Tom Watkins, at trial, testified that his reason for entering into the two contracts with 
Henry Day Ford was that he "wanted to buy the car that was known at the time as the Ford 
GT40 . . ." Tr. 72: 9-13. The GT40, according to Watkins, based on trade journal articles he had 
read, had been introduced as a concept car at the "Detroit Auto Show," at which Ford had 
1
 See cases cited by Henry Day Ford at pp. 14-15 n.2 of its Brief. Henry Day Ford cited these and 
similar cases to the trial court in arguing that the term "GT40" was clear and unambiguous, and 
that the trial court had to determine the meaning of term by reference only to the parties' 
8 
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announced plans to put it, the GT40, into production. Tr. 40: 25-41:8. That Ford Motor Co. in 
fact introduced and unveiled the GT40 concept car at the 2002 auto show in Detroit, and 
announced plans to put it into production for distribution to the public, is established by Henry 
Day Ford's Trial Exhibit 12, if not by and through the testimony of Tom Watkins. Henry Day 
Ford tried, in closing argument, to disown and discredit its own Trial Exhibit 12, Tr. 166-167, 
claimed the exhibit "had not been presented" to the court, Tr. 166:7-14, and even asserted that 
its Trial Exhibit 12 was not its exhibit, Tr. 167:23. Henry Day Ford's Trial Exhibit 12, which is a 
Ford Motor Co. Bulletin dated June, 20032, discusses the evolution of the vehicle/model that 
Watkins read about and wanted to buy, from a concept car originally designated by Ford as the 
"GT40," to production, as the Ford UGT." As Henry Day Ford notes in its Brief, at 29, the names 
"GT40" and "GT" in its Trial Exhibit 12 "seem to be used interchangeably." Henry Day Ford's 
manager, Steve Kersey, who prepared and signed the contracts for the conditional sale of two 
"GT40s," confirmed that the vehicle identified in the contracts as the "GT40" was the later 
produced Ford GT, Tr. 112:14-18, which was at the time the contracts were made was still called 
the "GT40." When asked by Watkins' counsel to confirm that the "GT," which Ford, 
commencing in 2004 or 2005 allocated to Henry Day Ford, was the same model that Ford had 
earlier introduced as the "GT40," Jeremy Day answered, " . . . I believe so. I think the evidence 
contracts, without resort to or consideration of extrinsic evidence. 
2
 See Addendum D to Appellant's Brief and Addendum D to this Reply Brief. 
3
 Even though the contracts do not expressly say so, Henry Day Ford's future obligation to sell 
Watkins a GT40, as it was then called, was conditioned on Ford Motor Co. subsequently 
allocating to it one or two GT40s. At the time the contracts were made, Henry Day Ford was not 
certain it would be allocated any of the vehicles that Ford had unveiled at the auto show in 
Detroit; a possibility that Watkins understood. The condition precedent, however, is not evident 
based on a reading of just the contract language itself. 
9 
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says that it was, yes." Tr. 126:25-127:9. 
The subject matter of Watkins' and Henry Day Ford's contracts was the vehicle theit Ford 
Motor Co. unveiled at the North American International Auto Show in Detroit, at the time named 
the GT40, which it announced would be put into production for future distribution to the public. 
Watkins in March 2002, asked Henry Day Ford if it would be willing to sell him a "GT40." He 
referred to the vehicle that he hoped to purchase as the "GT40," because that was the name that 
Ford attached to the concept car. See Henry Day Ford's Trial Exhibit no. 12 (Addendum "A" 
hereto). The contracts, likewise, referred to "GT40s," because that was the name by which the 
vehicle was known at the time. Watkins, Tr. 47:9-13. "GT40," thus, was a term that Watkins and 
Henry Day Ford used to describe the model/vehicle that Ford had introduced at the Detroit auto 
show as the GT40, and announced would be put into production. The parties' intentions, as 
adjudged in the context of events in 2002, do not support the conclusion that the parties' use of 
the term "GT40" unambiguously denoted a vehicle other than and different from the "GT" that 
Ford later produced and distributed, where "GT40" and "GT" were different names applied, by 
Ford to the same vehicle. See Henry Day Ford Trial Exhibit 12 (Addendum UA" hereto). 
Henry Day Ford's Trial Exhibit 12, Addendum "A" hereto, a Ford Motor Co. Bulletin 
dated June 2003, suggests, as Henry Day Ford observes at p. 29 of its Brief, that UGT40" and 
"GT," as of June 2003, were designations still being "used interchangeably" to identify a single 
vehicle/model. The fact that Ford sometime between early 2002 and late 2004 shortened the 
designation of the vehicle that Watkins contracted to buy, from "GT40" to "GT," does not mean 
that the "GT," as the model had now come to be known, was a model other than and distinct 
from the vehicle/model that Henry Day Ford had agreed to sell to Watkins. The name change of 
10 
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the model from "GT40" to "GT" does not and did not negate Henry Day Ford's contractual 
obligation to Watkins. 
Assume, hypothetically, that two thoroughbred horse breeders, A and B, agree, in writing, 
that A will buy from B, for $100,000, a two year old stallion named Alpha, if B should be able to 
aquire Alpha from C anytime within the next three years. C changes Alpha's name to Beta, 
re-registers the stallion as "Beta," then, within two years of the date of A's and B's contract, sells 
"Beta" to B. Can B then refuse to sell "Beta" to A on the ground that their contract obligated B to 
sell to A only if he, with three years after their contract, was able to acquire a stallion named 
"Alpha"? Watkins presumes the court would agree that B's obligation to sell the stallion now 
named Beta would remain, and that B could not refuse to sell the horse to A on A's tender to B 
of $ 100,000. The argument that Henry Day Ford makes, and the distinction it tries to draw 
between "GT40" and "GT" is no different. "GT40" and "GT," like "Alpha" and "Beta," is the 
same horse. 
In the context of the Alpha/Beta hypothetical, however, the parties' written contract, if 
interpreted in accordance with reference to only the words contained within the "four corners" of 
the contract, would appear to be unambiguous: the parties' agreement concerned the conditional 
future purchase and sale of a horse named "Alpha"; and as "Beta" is not "Alpha" then, obviously, 
B would have no obligation to sell "Beta" to A. Only by considering extrinsic evidence of what 
A and B meant by their reference to "Alpha," could the parties' intent, and the subject matter of 
their agreement, be correctly determined. The hypothetical reveals the peril in attempting to 
discern the ambiguity or meaning of words in a contract solely by reference to words with the 
four corners of the contract. 
11 
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D. Watkins' proffered interpretation of "GT40" was, and is tenable, plausible and 
reasonable. 
"A contractual term or provision is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one 
reasonable interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial 
deficiencies." Daines, 1J25. When determining whether terms or words in a contract are or are not 
ambiguous, any relevant evidence, including extrinsic evidence concerning the parties' intentions 
when they made their contract, "must be considered." Daines, ]f26; Ward, 907 P.2d at 268. "After 
a judge considers relevant and contrary interpretations, the judge must ensure that 'the 
interpretations contended for are reasonably supported by the language of the contract.'" Daines, 
Tf26 (quoting Ward, 907 P.2d at 268). "A finding of ambiguity after a review of relevant, 
extrinsic evidence is appropriate only when 'reasonably supported by the language of the 
contract.'" Daines, f27 (quoting Ward, 907 P.2d at 268). 
The parties' use of the term "GT40" in their two contracts, Watkins contends, referred to 
a concept car that Ford unveiled at the North American Auto Show in Detroit, that was loosely 
based on the GT40s that Ford had earlier produced and raced in the 1960s at Le Mans, and which 
Ford announced would be put into production and made available for sale to the public. See 
Henry Day Ford's Trial Exhibit 12 (Addendum "A" hereto). The parties, according to Watkins, 
used the name "GT40" to identify the vehicle/model that was the subject of their agreement, 
because that is what Ford called it when it introduced the vehicle at the auto show in Detroit. See 
Henry Day Ford's Trial Exhibit no. 12 (Addendum "A" hereto). According to Watkins, he and 
Henry Day Ford knew that it might take several years before the vehicle reached the production 
stage and was available for distribution to dealers, and sale to the public. See Finding of Fact no. 
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18. The subject matter of their agreement, according to Watkins, remained the vehicle/model that 
Ford had originally designated as the GT40, as that vehicle/model moved into production and, 
later, was offered for sale to the public. That Ford later changed the name of the vehicle/model to 
"GT," did not change the subject matter of Watkins' and Henry Day Ford's agreement. 
Watkins submits that this is the correct interpretation of what he and Henry Day Ford 
meant by their use of "GT40" in the two contracts into which they entered in March 2002. 
Certainly it is a reasonable and plausible interpretation. As such, the trial court was obligated to 
consider Watkins' interpretation of "GT40," instead of concluding, based solely on the "plain 
meaning" of the contracts, that the "GT40" was clearly a different vehicle/model than the model 
that Ford later produced and marketed as the "GT." 
Watkins submits that his proffered interpretation of GT40 is, in fact, more reasonable and 
plausible than the alternative interpretation that Henry Day Ford champions. Henry Day Ford 
argued at trial that the "GT40" clearly identified a model other than the "GT," based on nothing 
more than the label "GT" was not followed by the number "40." Implied by Henry Day Ford's 
interpretation was that there existed, in 2002, a model that was either in production, or would be 
put into production, as the GT40, and which was different than the model that reached 
production and was later marketed as the "GT." Henry Day Ford, however, offered no evidence 
to support this assumption. 
Henry Day Ford's suggestion at trial that "GT40" referred not to the "GT" that evolved 
from the concept car that Ford introduced in 2002 as the "GT40," but instead referred to a model 
that Ford might, possibly someday manufacture and sell, see Henry Day Ford's closing argument 
at Tr. 178, defies credulity. This interpretation requires a court to believe, and conclude, that 
13 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Watkins sought out Henry Day Ford, and that he put down a cash deposit, just so that if Ford 
again someday introduced and manufactured a model it called a "GT40," he would have the first 
crack at buying it. 
The more reasonable and plausible interpretation is that the subject matter of the pcirties' 
agreement was the vehicle, then designated as the "GT40," that Ford unveiled in Detroit in early 
2002, that it said would be put into production and which it did put into production, albeit as the 
"GT." 
E. The presence of an integration clause in a contract does not as Henry Day Ford 
contends, prelude a court's consideration of extrinsic, or "parol," evidence to 
determine the meaning of words and terms in the contract. 
The presence of an integration clause in a written agreement signifies to a court the 
parties' professed belief that they have included in their written agreement, all material terms of 
their agreement. A party cannot, in the face of a complete integration clause, argue for the 
recognition and enforcement of an additional term to which the parties allegedly agreed, but 
which is not to be found in the parties' written integrated agreement. 
An integration clause restricts a party's ability to argue that their Agreement includes 
additional terms not mentioned in a written agreement. The presence in a contract of an 
integration clause, however, does not preclude a court from considering extrinsic or parol 
evidence in order to interpret and determine the meaning of words and terms that are used in 
contract. Hessler v. Crystal Lake Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 338 111. App 3d 1010, 788 N.E. 2d 
405, 413 (2003). According to Corbin: 
Even if a written document has been assented to as the complete and accurate 
integration of the terms of a contract, it must still be interpreted; and all those 
factors that are of assistance in this process may be proved by oral testimony. 
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6 Corbin on Contracts, § 579 (1979). Cantamar involved a promissory note/contract that the trial 
court concluded, and the Court of Appeals agreed, was an "integrated" agreement. Nonetheless, 
the Court of Appeals took on the task of reviewing the trial court's interpretation of terms in the 
integrated agreement, holding that u[w]hen determining whether a contract is ambiguous, any 
relevant evidence must be considered." Cantamar, [^26 (quoting Ward, 907 P.2d at 268) 
(emphasis in original). 
F. The trial court's conclusion of law that "GT40.," based on the "plain meaning" of 
the parties9 contracts, unambiguously referred to a vehicle other than the "GT" 
that Ford Motor Co. subsequently allocated to Henry Day Ford, should be reversed, 
and this case remanded for further proceedings. 
The trial court concluded, based solely on the "plain meaning" of parties' written 
agreements, that the parties' use of the term "GT40" was unambiguous, and that the "GT" was 
separate and a distinct vehicle/model. In making this determination, while eschewing the 
testimony of witnesses who testified as to the parties' intent at the time of the contracts were 
made, the trial court erred in concluding that the parties' contracts and, specifically, their 
reference to "GT40" was not ambiguous. Accordingly, the trial court's interpretation of the 
parties' contracts should be reversed, and this case be remanded to the trial court for further 
proceedings. See Cantamar, ^ [27. 
II. The trial court erred in concluding that Watkins waived his right to purchase from 
Henry Day Ford up to two Ford GTs (as the GT40 was later called), should Ford Motor 
Co. allocate Ford GTs to Henry Day Ford. 
A. The proof required to establish waiver is that enunciated by the Utah Supreme 
Court in the Soter's case. 
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Watkins agrees with Henry Day Ford that the standard of proof, to establish waiver, is 
that articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in Soter's v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan, 857 P.2d 935, 
942 (Utah 1993). Contrary to Henry Day Ford's argument in its Brief at 36, Watkins does not ask 
this court to revisit Soter's in order to readdress its holding. Indeed, it would be beyond the 
authority of this court to do so. 
According to the Utah Supreme Court, in Soter's, 
A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. To constitute 
waiver, there must be an existing right, benefit or advantage, a knowledge of its 
existence, and an intention to relinquish it. 
Soter's, 857 P.2d at 942 (Utah 1993) (emphasis added). 
An intent to relinquish a legal right, according to Soter's, must be "distinct." As the Utah 
Supreme Court put it, 
We further clarify that the intent to relinquish a right must be distinct. Under 
this legal standard, a fact finder need only determine whether the totality of 
circumstances "warrants the inference of relinquishment." 
Soter's, 942 (emphasis added). The adjective "distinct" suggests something more than proof of 
mere intent. "A distinct intent to waive mus t . . . be shown by a preponderance of the evidence." 
Soter's, 942 n.6 (emphasis added). 
The question before this court, on appeal, is not a challenge to the standard enunciated by 
Soter's for proving waiver. The issue on appeal is whether the facts, as decided at trial, support a 
legal conclusion that Watkins' actions and conduct established his distinct intention to waive 
legal rights that, at the time, he knew he had. 
Watkins testified at trial that he did not intend to waive his rights to purchase from Henry 
Day Ford two Ford GT40s (or GTs as they were later called) if Ford Motor Co., notwithstanding 
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Henry Day Ford's letter dated December 31, 2002, subsequently allocated to Henry Day Ford one 
or more of the vehicle/model that was the subject of his contracts with Henry Day Ford. See 
Watkins' trial testimony at Tr. 68:20-25. Watkins contends on appeal that a distinct intention to 
waive legal rights vis-a-vis Henry Day Ford that he allegedly knew he had, cannot be implied or 
inferred based on the fact that he cashed the check provided to him by Henry Day Ford, 
especially in light of what Henry Day Ford told him in the letter that it mailed with the check. 
Nor can his intentional waiver of a known legal right be inferred based on his alleged silence 
over the next 2 Vi years, nor can it be based on other miscellaneous conduct. 
B. Watkins has marshaled evidence and argument in support of the trial court's 
findings and conclusions on waiver. 
Henry Day Ford asserts, in its Brief, that Watkins failed to marshal evidence and 
argument in support of the trial court's Findings and Conclusions. Appellee's Brief at 3. To the 
contrary, Watkins acknowledged his duty to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's 
findings and conclusions, and did so. Appellant's Brief at 33-36. 
C. The evidence at trial, when marshaled, does not establish or indicate a distinct 
intention by Tom Watkins to waive a contractual right that was known to him. 
The evidence which Henry Day Ford argues establishes Tom Watkins' unequivocal 
waiver of his rights, see Appellee's Brief at 38-40, has been addressed and examined by Watkins 
in his initial Brief. Appellant's Brief at 36-42. To readdress all those arguments in this Reply 
Brief in detail would be unnecessary and redundant. 
Suffice it to say, the principal event on which Henry Day Ford bases its claim of waiver, 
as implied from Watkins' conduct, is Watkins' act of cashing the check for $2,000 that Henry 
Day Ford mailed to him on December 31, 2002. What Henry Day Ford wants to gloss over, or 
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bury entirely, is its misleading statement in the letter that accompanied the check, in which Henry 
Day Ford said: 
We regret to inform you that our allocation is not going to allow us to receive this 
vehicle. 
See Addendum "C" to Appellant's Brief. Watkins, in reliance on this statement, negotiated the 
check that Henry Day Ford mailed to him. He negotiated the check because he assumed that 
Henry Day Ford, as it said, would not be allocated the vehicle that Henry Day Ford had agreed to 
sell and that he had agreed to buy. Watkins, Tr. 80:16-20. The only reasonable inference to be 
drawn from Watkins' act of cashing the check is that he believed Henry Day Ford when it 
informed him that it would not be allocated, as it said, "this vehicle." 
Henry Day Ford contends that it acted in good faith in returning Watkins' two $1,000 
deposits because it thought it unlikely that it would be allocated any GT40s, or GTs as the model 
was later called, given that Ford had apparently informed its dealers that it would distribute 
vehicles to dealers who won the President's Award or the Share of the Nation Award, as Henry 
Day Ford had previously won neither. Henry Day Ford in its letter to Watkins, though, did not 
say to Watkins that it thought it unlikely that it would be allocated the vehicle; instead it 
informed him that "our allocation is not going to allow us to receive this vehicle." As a 
consequence of Henry Day Ford's statement, Watkins had no reason to think or know that he 
retained any legal rights to purchase a Ford GT40 (or GT as it was later called). As Henry Day 
Ford's obligation to sell Watkins a Ford GT40 (or whatever it was later called) was subject to a 
condition precedent, Ford's future allocation to Henry Day Ford of a GT40 (or GT as later 
named), Watkins' legal right and obligation to purchase "the vehicle" would be activated only if 
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Ford Motor Co., a third party, allocated to Henry Day Ford one or more of the vehicles that was 
the subject of Watkins' and Henry Day Ford's contracts. By informing Watkins that it would not 
be allocated and would not receive any such vehicles, Henry Day Ford in effect advised Watkins 
that the condition precedent, on which their mutual obligations were based, would not occur. In 
cashing the check, Watkins, given Henry Day Ford's representation, would have had no reason to 
think that an allocation by Ford remained a possibility. Hence, an inference that Watkins knew he 
was waiving a known right cannot be drawn from his act of cashing Henry Day Ford's check. 
Henry Day Ford argues that Watkins' failure to complain confirms that he waived his 
rights. But what reason had Watkins to complain, if Ford Motor Co. had determined not to 
allocate any GT40s (or GTs) to Henry Day Ford? 
Henry Day Ford similarly argues that Watkins' silence between December 31, 2002 and 
June 2005 confirms that he knowingly waived his right to purchase a GT for MSRP. Again, the 
date for performance under the contracts was not the date of the contracts; but was the date on 
which Henry Day Ford ordered its first GT40 - which it could order only if Ford Motor Co. 
allocated to it one or more GT40s (or whatever it later called the GT40). Watkins thus had no 
right to purchase from Henry Day Ford a GT until December 2004, which is when Ford 
(notwithstanding Henry Day Ford's 12/31/02 letter to Watkins) invoiced Henry Day Ford for a 
2005 Ford GT Coupe, which Henry Day Ford testified at trial as not delivered to it until May 31, 
2005. See Finding of Fact no. 32. On discovering that Ford had in fact allocated to Henry Day 
Ford a GT, Watkins immediately presented himself at Henry Day Ford, and demanded it sell to 
him the GT or GTs it had ordered and received. Watkins did not sit on his rights once he learned 
Henry Day Ford had ordered and received a GT. Waiver, thus, cannot be inferred by Watkins' 
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alleged delay in demanding that Henry Day Ford sell him a Ford GT. 
Most troubling to Watkins is Henry Day Ford's argument that "Watkins, as an 
experienced automobile dealer, knew his rights under the Contracts, and clearly demonstrated his 
intention to relinquish those rights when he negotiated the $2,000.00 check." Appellee's Brief at 
38. This is a nice sounding, but general and substantively meaningless statement. What "rights" 
did Watkins know he had? Did he have special rights known to him, solely because he is an 
owner of a motor vehicle dealership? What "rights," allegedly known to Watkins, did he 
knowingly release? Why would Watkins' negotiation of the check evidence a waiver of his 
rights, given Henry Day Ford's advice that "its allocation [was] not going to allow [it] to receive 
this vehicle?" These are questions for which Watkins, at least, does not know the answers. 
Watkins never expressly waived any legal rights he had against Henry Day Ford. Nor did 
Henry Day Ford ever ask him to. The question on appeal is, can a distinct intention by Watkins to 
waive a known legal right be inferred or implied based on his act of cashing Henry Day Ford's 
check, his failure to protest Henry Day Ford's return of the $2,000, and his silence over the next 
2 Vi years. Although a waiver can be implied from a party's conduct, "it will not be implied from 
doubtful acts." Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, 2003 UT 51, f84, 82 P.3d 1076. "When waiver is to be 
implied from conduct, the acts, conduct or circumstances relied upon to show waiver must make 
out a clear case." 31 C.J.S. Estoppel and Waiver § 290 at 706 (2008). As the Utah Supreme 
Court stated and emphasized in Soter's, the "totality of circumstances" must indicate and 
establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, a distinct intention by a person to relinquish a 
legal right that the person knows he has. Soter's, 942. Watkins' conduct, in cashing Henry Day 
Ford's check (based on the letter he received) and otherwise, does not prove his distinct intention 
20 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to waive his rights. Watkins' act of cashing Henry Day Ford's check establishes only his belief 
and assumption that Henry Day Ford was being forthright and accurate when it informed 
Watkins that Ford Motor Co. would not be allocating to Henry Day Ford the vehicle/model 
which Henry Day Ford had contracted to sell to him, if it subsequently received any such 
vehicles. 
The facts and evidence at trial do not, in sum, support the trial court's conclusion of law 
that Watkins, by his conduct and actions, waived his legal rights against Henry Day Ford. 
Dated: April 22, 2010 
By 
P. Bryan Fishburn 
Attorney for Appellant, Tom 
Watkins 
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